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NUDGE, CHOICE ARCHITECTURE, AND
LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISMt
Pierre Schlag*
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS.
By Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press. 2008. Pp. x, 282. $26.
INTRODUCTION
By all external appearances, Nudge is a single book-two covers, a sin-
gle spine, one title. But put these deceptive appearances aside, read the
thing, and you will actually find two books-Book One and Book Two.
Book One begins with the behavioral economist's view that sometimes
individuals are not the best judges of their own welfare. Indeed, given the
propensity of human beings for cognitive errors (e.g., the availability bias)
and the complexity of decisions that need to be made (e.g., choosing pre-
scription plans), individuals often make mistakes. Enter here the idea of the
nudge-the deliberate effort to channel people into making the selections
that are best for them. The key thing about a nudge is that it's noncoercive
and there's always an opt out.
The nudge is an idea that ought to appeal to many people on the political
spectrum. The basic idea is that institutions, including the government,
inevitably structure the choices that people make (Cass Sunstein' and Rich-
ard Thaler2 aptly call this a "choice architecture"). Their idea is that we
might as well be thoughtful about how to structure our choice architectures.
Choices are being driven by choice architecture anyway, so why not do a
good job of it as opposed to a bad job or no job at all in structuring the
thing?
This is the gist of the first book. Understood as an idea about how to im-
prove government delivery of services, Sunstein and Thaler's theory is
really hard to fault.3 They have aptly described a way of thinking about gov-
ernment programs and regulation that could well improve the delivery of
t © 2009 Pierre Schlag. All rights reserved.
* Byron R. White Professor of Law, University of Colorado. My thanks to Scott Moss for
his comments on a prior draft.
I. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Administrator; Felix Frankfurter Professor
of Law, Harvard Law School.
2. Ralph and Dorothy Keller Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and
Economics, University of Chicago.
3. Sunstein and Thaler's prescriptions extend beyond government to all manner of institu-
tions. But the great bulk of their work pertains to government. In this Review, I have confined my
thoughts accordingly.
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government services. "Choice architecture" could even become part of the
new regulatory lexicon; it's evocative and it's smart. And they've operation-
alized it (which is an important thing given Cass Sunstein's current job
description as head of OIRA--Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
fairs).
Then there's Book Two. This book is also about nudge. Nudge on ster-
oids. This is the book where Nudge-the insight about how to improve
delivery of services-turns into the full-fledged ideology that Sunstein and
Thaler call "libertarian paternalism." In its libertarian moment, libertarian
paternalism eschews command-and-control regulations in favor of regimes
designed to allow individuals to "go their own way." In its paternalist aspect,
libertarian paternalism nonetheless allows the government to structure the
regime with a view to achieving set government goals. The defining charac-
teristic of this ideology (besides its origins in Nudge) is a persistent drive to
find the middle ground between libertarians and paternalists, Democrats and
Republicans. This is what makes Book Two different: In Book Two, Sun-
stein and Thaler are not simply interested in correcting for cognitive error or
improving the choice architecture of government programs, but in displac-
ing ideological competitors on the right and the left. They are quite
deliberately looking to flesh out that elusive "Third Way."
Book Two is a pretty far cry from Book One. True, Sunstein and Thaler
are still aiming for moderation with libertarian paternalism-trying to find
"the middle way," as it were. But they're pretty assertive about it. Call it
assertive centrism.5
Book One and Book Two are not unrelated, but it will be part of my cen-
tral point here that the not inconsiderable virtues of Book One (the Nudge)
do not transpose easily into Book Two (Libertarian Paternalism). Part of the
reason is that the spectrum on which libertarian paternalism registers-one
defined by Republicans and Democrats-is just not all that interesting. Sun-
stein and Thaler are perhaps right to claim that we are tired of the needless
polarization between Republicans and Democrats. But my guess is that we
will also be tired of approaches that do little more than mediate between the
two. The big problem then with libertarian paternalism is not that it is an
oxymoron (something that Sunstein and Thaler explicitly acknowledge and
address) but that it lies on the axis defined by its parent conceptions.
BOOK ONE: THE NUDGE
Imagine along with Sunstein and Thaler a tribe of "Econs." These are
people who are unfailingly adept at making decisions for themselves. They
4. Consider the announcement by Peter Orszag, head of the OMB, endorsing Cass Sun-
stein's approach. Office of Management and Budget Blog, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/09/
04/20/NudgingAlong (Apr. 20, 2009, 19:33 EST).
5. Cf Ronald Dworkin, Looking for Cass Sunstein, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, April 30, 2009 (re-
viewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING DOCUMENT
DOESN'T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE (2009)) (describing Sunstein's approach to constitutional
law as "aggressive modesty").
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are at the very least better at it than third parties (most notably, that third
party known as "government"). Econs are incarnations of the familiar econ-
textbook persona known as the rational utility maximizer. According to Sun-
stein and Thaler, the problem with Econs is that, for the most part, they
don't exist. Turns out that the world is populated mostly with "Humans."
These are people who make predictable and recurring cognitive mistakes.
Humans are known to chronically underestimate the time it takes them
to finish projects (the planning fallacy). They have a tendency to stick with
the status quo even when it's not in their interest (inertia). They routinely
assess risk based on the most recent, most salient, most accessible examples
of those risks (availability bias). They estimate probabilities based on the
degree to which the event is deemed as representative of the category (repre-
sentativeness). In short, they make precisely the sorts of cognitive errors
(there are many more) that hundreds of studies by psychologists and behav-
ioral economists have diagnosed and documented over the last several
decades.6
Based on this wealth of knowledge, Sunstein and Thaler recommend
that government and other institutions take these errors into account in for-
mulating programs and policies. Their idea is to nudge people (push them a
little) into making the decisions that are right for them.
How should institutions do that? Enter here the idea of "choice architec-
ture." With regard to many decisions that people make, they are offered a
menu of options. This holds true for choosing food in cafeteria lines as well
as for the selection of savings plans and much more. Sunstein and Thaler's
idea is that whoever is in charge of the choice architecture (the cafeteria su-
pervisor or the government) should frame the choices so as to lead most of
the Humans to make the choices that are right for them.
How does one do that? Well, start with their example of how not to do it.
Imagine, for a moment, the perennially distracted law professor down the
hall. Come this May, there is a damned good chance (you know this) that he
will forget to choose a health plan. Being a good colleague, you will remind
him of course, but chances are he will forget anyway. Now, if the default
rule (the rule that applies unless another option is deliberately chosen) is no
plan, the law professor will be in trouble. The "no plan" default rule is
plainly a bad one. Better to pick as a default some health plan (the cheapest
one? the one last year?) than none at all. This is a nudge. In fact, this kind of
nudge is the mother of all nudges-the default rule. Picking smart default
rules is a key way of nudging people.
But the default rule is hardly the only form of nudge available. There are
a number of basic strategies for dealing with cognitive errors.
One approach is to bypass and even enlist cognitive errors. Take em-
ployment savings plans, for instance. People say they want to save, but then
fail to follow through. They're subject to a loss-aversion error: they don't
want to see their paychecks reduced. What to do? Well, Thaler and others
6. Sunstein and Thaler have compiled an impressive and very useful bibliography. See
pp. 263-82.
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have developed a "save more tomorrow" program, which enlists people to
commit themselves to a series of savings contributions timed with pay raises
in the future. In this way, people don't see their paychecks go down, and
thus the "loss aversion error" is bypassed. Meanwhile, inertia is on the side
of saving as opposed to not, and thus the "status quo bias" is enlisted to help
reach the right choice.
Another way to nudge people is to counteract the impetus for the cogni-
tive errors. One example here is the "cooling off' period, which allows
consumers to renege on big purchases within a limited number of days. The
idea is to allow consumers to decide rationally on their purchases outside
the reach of high pressure sales people or the momentary lure of temptation.
Yet another way to nudge people is to prime them into making the right
choices. If you want people to vote, for instance, call them up the day before
and ask them whether they intend to vote. Studies show that positive re-
sponses to that question increase the likelihood that they will actually vote.
Still another form of nudge is simply to provide information that could
be useful in making choices. Sunstein and Thaler believe it's useful to com-
pel better information disclosure in everything from mortgages to car sales.
The point is to allow people to "RECAP"-record, evaluate, and compare
alternative prices.
There are lots of ways to nudge people, and part of the appeal of Sun-
stein and Thaler's book is the multiple contexts in which they talk about
nudging: speeding on curved roads, retirement plans, mortgages, medical
treatment options, car buying, and so on. None of it is terribly earth shatter-
ing. But it's interesting. And after going through so many examples, the
reader (you or I) becomes trained in recognizing possibilities for nudging.
Through sheer repetition and priming, we have been nudged.
So who could disagree with all this?7 I mean, here Sunstein and Thaler
have come up with an operationalized set of suggestions for improving the
delivery of government services. Surely, if government is to deliver services
such as health care and the like, it would be desirable to avoid the waste
wrought by cognitive errors. Smart choice architectures can do that, and if
7. There's Judge Posner, of course. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Eco-
nomics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1551 (1998) (criticizing the early Jolls, Thaler, and Sunstein
behavioral law and economics work). And there's Gerg Gigerenzer as well. He is among those who
challenge the received learning on cognitive errors and biases as based on an inadequate model of
rational decision-making contexts. According to Gigerenzer, the cognitive-error and biases literature
is based on studies that presuppose probabilities of correct outcomes. This research methodology
thus presupposes reference points that are often unavailable in actual rational decision-making situa-
tions. When tested in "real world" situations, the heuristics that supposedly lead to "errors" and
"biases" are revealed to be fast, frugal, and useful. For elaboration, compare D. Kahneman & A.
Tversky, On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions: A Reply to Gigenernzer's Critique, 103 PSYCH. REv.
582 (1996), with Gerg Gigerenzer, On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman
and Tversky, 103 PSYCH. REV. 592 (1996). For a general discussion of "fast and frugal" heuristics,
see GERG GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICs THAT MAKE US SMART (1999).
8. Many of the suggestions (as well as the general approach) were developed in prior arti-
cles. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case
for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
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Sunstein and Thaler are right, many choice architectures can push people to
the right choices without constraining freedom of choice (or at least, not
very much).
There is something appealing about all this and I think it has to do with
the avoidance of waste. An unthinking choice architecture that simply
"maximizes choices" is bound to lead the Humans, even if not the Econs,
astray. Anticipating what people want or care about most seems sensible-at
least if you're already committed to allowing them to choose. Meanwhile, if
you can help the Humans without preventing the Econs from making their
preferred choices, where's the harm? The benefits of nudging seem to be
very large and the costs very small-which is precisely Sunstein and Tha-
ler's key point.
Is nudging then unexceptionable? Well .... no. A few problems or chal-
lenges come to mind: (1) What to optimize? (2) When is a nudge a shove?
(3) Should we prefer experts? and (4) When do we nudge?
What to optimize? One problem is that Sunstein and Thaler are not en-
tirely clear about what we are trying to optimize when we are called on to
nudge people. Early on, they talk about what people "would actually want"
(p. 12; emphasis added). At another point they talk about people's "self-
interest" (p. 203; emphasis added). And at still another point they say that
"[a]s usual, the place to start is with people's actual goals and intentions"
(p. 224; emphasis added). But want, self-interest, and actual goals and inten-
tions are not self-evidently the same thing. If you have any doubts, assume
you're a law professor and think about what you might want to do this
summer (sky's the limit), and compare it to your stated goals and intentions
(your summer stipend request) and also to your interest (long-term career
objectives). My guess is that there may be a bit of disjuncture. Sometimes,
of course, the difference between wants, stated goals and intentions, and
interest will be inconsequential. Think again, for instance, of the distracted
professor down the hall. It's a pretty easy call that he should not end up with
no health plan regardless of whether we are concerned with his wants, inter-
ests, or goals and intentions. But not all nudging decisions are going to be
that easy, and some precision in defining the object of our optimization
might be helpful. Still no big deal.
When is a nudge a shove? This, as Sunstein and Thaler say at the end, is
a tricky matter (p. 251). We are dealing with a spectrum-everything from
voluntary release of information to compelled-disclosure requirements
aimed at facilitating boycotts (p. 191). Some nudges land harder than others.
One suspects, for instance, that those who are blacklisted as a result of com-
pelled-disclosure requirements will view the requirements as coercive, not a
nudge at all. But so it goes: This is what happens when you bring in per-
spective. Someone's nudge is someone else's compulsory mechanism. And
it may well turn out too that a "nudge-in-action" will be more coercive than
"a command and control regulation-in-the-books." Still no big deal.
Should we prefer experts? As partisans of behavioral economics, Sun-
stein and Thaler definitely believe that choice architects can make life better
for Humans, even if not for Econs. But they've looked only at one side of
April 2010]
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the equation. Yes, human beings are sometimes prone to cognitive error, but
what about the choice architects-the experts? Somehow Sunstein and Tha-
ler have failed to ask this question in any serious way.9 What they have not
looked at is whether experts are themselves prone to cognitive errors-
including cognitive errors induced by their roles and identities as experts or
by the character of their expertise. That Humans make mistakes is neither
here nor there unless we know something about the fallibility rates of the
experts who (1) are diagnosing the ostensible errors and (2) will use their
own judgment to correct for those errors. Then too, in any truly interesting
choice-architecture problem there will be a variety of experts and expert
frames that can be brought into play. So the obvious question: Should there
be a frame of frames? And which experts get to write the master script-the
lawyers, the economists, the scientists? Or should we retreat from the ques-
tion and opt for a hopefully benign chaos where the various expert types
have to fight it out-or perhaps nudge each other? This is kind of an unfair
point (because no one else seems to have a very good solution) but the prob-
lems in our time rarely come in the shape of a single frame for a single
nudger-in-chief.L' Our bureaucratic circumstances and expertise-driven cul-
ture entail the presence and the contest of multiple frames. (More on that
later.)
When do we nudge? Now this too is a difficult issue. Nudging, accord-
ing to Sunstein and Thaler, is the thing to do when it is most likely to help
the Humans and least likely to hurt the Econs (p. 72). When do Humans
most need help?
Well, when decisions are difficult, when feedback is generally lacking,
when people have difficulties understanding their choices, when choice is
fraught, when temptation looms (and so on) (pp. 72-80). This is a helpful
answer. But it answers only a narrow "when to nudge?" question. There is a
much broader "when to nudge?" question to be confronted, however, and it
is this: when is a problem one of choice architecture and when is it instead
one that involves other functions-say distributional choices over wealth
and rights, the promotion of values and norms, investment in coordination
systems ... and so on. Choice architecture is often inextricably intertwined
with these more transparently political questions. One can even wonder just
how often will one come across a function that is comprised purely of
choice architecture?
Oddly, Sunstein and Thaler have somehow managed to overlook this
issue. In their examples, they have often framed problems as simply self-
evident matters of choice architecture. This works pretty well for Book
9. They do recognize that the potential benefits of nudging depend on "the ability of the
Nudgers to make good guesses about what is best for the Nudgees." P. 247. They recognize as well
that "we need to be worried about incompetence and self-dealing on the part of the Nudgers." P.
248. What they fail to consider are the potential defects of "expertise" as aform of knowledge. For
elaboration, see Pierre Schlag, Commentary, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARv. L. REv. 877 (1997).
10. HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE 69-76 (2007) (describing
different epistemological bases for various forms of expertise and raising the meta-expertise ques-
tion about how to identify valid expertise).
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One-where all we are talking about is improving the delivery of a service
(cafeteria food, savings plans) that we have already agreed to provide to
an end user. It works less well when we confront transparently political
and legal questions where conflicting interests and activities are at stake.
This brings us to Book Two.
BOOK Two: LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM
In Book Two, Sunstein and Thaler tackle problems with the same
strategy-create incentives, disclose information, let people go their own
way: in short, nudge. But while the strategy is the same, the nature of the
problems is not. We are no longer talking about correcting for cognitive
errors, but rather about creating entitlement regimes. And the rationale has
changed as well: we're no longer just talking about waste avoidance, but
about reaching compromise that might satisfy both libertarians and pater-
nalists.
Now how does this happen? In part it's an issue of framing: From the
very beginning, Sunstein and Thaler present their book in terms of how a
service provider should structure choices for an end user. Most of their
examples in the beginning of the book involve situations where we have a
service provider and an end user. Importantly, the decision has already been
made to provide the service (e.g., cafeteria food, a road next to a lake, a
four-burner stove, a retirement-savings plan, etc.). The only remaining ques-
tion is how best to structure the provision of the service given the
characteristics of the user population. In other words, through their very
framing of the issue Sunstein and Thaler have already sidelined a great deal
of political and value concerns that might animate disagreement over how to
structure a regime. We've already decided that the issue is one of choice
architecture.
Many legal problems, however, do not frame easily in that way. They
involve bilateral or multilateral relations between "cooperative antagonists"-
i.e., employers-employees, consumers-producers, tenants-landlords, and so
on. In these kinds of situations-where activities and interests are in important
ways opposed-questions other than "choice architecture" are likely to fea-
ture prominently: Who gets the entitlement? What entitlement? What are the
relevant party identities? What are the relevant product/service markets?
What third parties are affected?" Sunstein and Thaler do not deal with these
kinds of issues. And as a result, it's not clear that nudges will always or even
generally be preferable to prohibitions, inalienability rules, command and
11. It's fair to say that economic thinkers in law have not always been terribly attentive to
these aesthetic-political questions. For elaboration, see Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction
Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Commentary, The Aesthetics of American
Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1076-77 (2002). Ronald Coase, by contrast, cautioned early on about
the importance of aesthetics to economic analysis. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L.
& EcON. 1, 43 (1960) (endorsing his mentor Frank Knight's admonition that "problems of welfare
economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals").
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control, and the like. 12 Similarly, it's not clear that "choice architecture" is
the right framing.
To grasp the point, consider what Sunstein and Thaler have to say about
how nudges and choice architecture might "help save the planet." Sunstein
and Thaler note that most of the time, when government has sought to pro-
tect the environment or to control the harmful effects of pollution, they have
done so through command-and-control strategies. Noting that these strate-
gies have sometimes helped (the air today is much cleaner as a result of
emissions control), Sunstein and Thaler nonetheless contend that the strate-
gies "look uncomfortably similar to Soviet-style five-year plans, in which
bureaucrats in Washington announce that millions of people have to change
their conduct in the next five years." (p. 184). In short, the strategies look
and feel coercive. And so in keeping with their preference for nudges, Sun-
stein and Thaler then suggest that incentivizing nudges in the form of cap
and trade or taxes on pollution may be better than strict command-and-
control measures.
O.K.-but that leaves an important question: is libertarian paternalism
the right form of analysis? Sunstein and Thaler write the following:
Especially when compared with command-and-control systems, economic
incentives have a strong libertarian element. Liberty is much greater when
people are told, "You can continue your behavior, so long as you pay for
the social harm it does" than when they are told, "You must act exactly as
the government says." Companies much prefer cap-and-trade systems to
rigid government commands, because such systems allow more freedom
and impose lower costs." (p. 186)
Now, the problem I want to focus on here is not the endorsement of cap and
trade per se, but rather the supporting argument. The problem is that Sun-
stein and Thaler's talk of "freedom of choice" obfuscates the main reason to
use cap and trade. The main reason to use cap and trade is that it will be
more efficient: companies will have different cost-control capacities with
regard to carbon emission. We shouldn't lose track of that. Sunstein and
Thaler are aware of this: "A central advantage of such a [cap-and-trade] sys-
tem is that it would ensure that reductions would be made by those who
could do so most cheaply." (p. 188). Right exactly. That's the argument-not
this vague talk about "freedom of choice" that can serve only to muddy up
the analysis, particularly as Sunstein and Thaler look only at one side of the
equation (the polluter's choices).
And that brings up a more serious problem: In a post-Hohfeld, post-
Hale, post-Coase world, this "freedom of choice" analysis is incomplete. 3
Where there is friction or conflict between two or more activities, interests,
12. 1 tend to stick with the agnosticism of Coase, who opined that the firm, government, or
the market might each be an appropriate mechanism depending on the circumstances. Coase, supra
note 11, at 18.
13. See id.; Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913).
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or parties, you simply cannot say that "liberty is much greater" under your
preferred regime merely because that regime increases one side's liberty. In
conflictual situations where interests are opposed, you simply cannot make
any claims whatsoever about whether there is a net liberty increase without
looking at how all the affected parties are impacted. Nor can you--on pain
of making the classic cognitive error called "anchoring"-say that a move
from a command-and-control to a nudge regime has a strong libertarian
element without specifying for whom.
Where climate change is concerned, choice architecture may not be the
right rubric. One tip off is that some of the most interested parties-future
generations-are not invited to the table to make any choices at all. What
matters for them is how successful we are (and at what cost to them) in fore-
stalling climate change.' 4 Their freedom of choice is basically whatever they
have left over after we have exercised our freedom of choice. What matters
to them in terms of their "freedom of choice" is whether what we have done
in the present generation works or not.
Now the problem is not that cap and trade is always or generally inferior
to command and control or tax measures (one would need to know some-
thing about specific context as well the substantive content of the cap and
trade, the tax, and command-and-control options). Rather the point is, you
simply cannot tell by the form of a regulation-i.e., its degree of "nudgi-
ness"-whether it is going to be more or less restrictive of liberty than the
other options. The reason is simple: what may look like a nudge when we
are talking about two parties (carbon producers and environmentalists) may
look like command and control once we take into account third-party effects
(future generations), externalities (local victims), technological constraints
(temporal irreversibilities), and so on.
I wouldn't make such a big deal out of this except that there is a huge
difference between applying nudges in contexts that we agree call for choice
architecture (e.g., cafeteria lines) and nudges in contexts that inevitably in-
volve opposed interests and coercion (e.g., climate change). And the thing is
that a lot of the problems that Sunstein and Thaler discuss-school choice,
malpractice waivers, gay marriage-are of the latter variety. If libertarian
paternalism is to be a viable candidate for addressing these latter kinds of
problems, then it is going to have to answer the question why we should
approach these problems in "choice architecture" terms rather than in the
other ways. Not only have Sunstein and Thaler failed to answer this ques-
tion, they have not posed it at all.
Perhaps then we ought to look more closely at the way in which Sun-
stein and Thaler have framed their presentation of choice architecture and
libertarian paternalism. This will allow us to see what is appealing about the
ideas as well as what is not. Here I want to resort to the idea of deep
14. What matters for future generations in cap and trade is the level at which the cap is effec-
tively set plus whatever wealth savings are accrued for them by virtue of the regime's being one of
cap and trade (as opposed to, say, a simple carbon tax).
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framing." There are two deep frames that are important to the rhetorical
appeal of this book, but also limit its scope and reach. Importantly, the two
deep frames conflict.
The first frame is a rhetorical device designed to elicit assent: libertarian
paternalism is presented as the moderate alternative to two extremes
(laissez-faire on the right and command and control on the left). Those who
have followed Sunstein's elaboration of "incompletely theorized agree-
ments" and "theoretical minimalism" will recognize this rhetorical device
and his instinct for the middle of the road: the idea is to find the overlapping
consensus, the largest common denominator, the middle ground. The appeal
of the device is twofold. First, it has the feel of realpolitick insofar as it ad-
dresses the ideologies of actual political actors (think here, as Sunstein and
Thaler suggest, of Democrats and Republicans). Second, it has the aura of
evenhandedness: everyone gives in a little on their ideological commitments
and (nearly) everyone is made better off.
But the apparent symmetry of this rhetorical device is belied by a second
frame-an ideological one. As a matter of form most of Sunstein and
Thaler's book is addressed to libertarians-explaining to them why they
should get off their dime and accept a light touch of paternalism here and
there. The book is a sustained effort to justify departures from a certain set
of parallel baseline positions. To wit:
From Classical Microeconomics to Behavioral Economics;
From Econs to Humans;
From the "Maximize Choice" Mantra to Nudging;
From Libertarianism to Libertarian Paternalism.
In our political culture, the move from libertarianism to paternalism is
arguably a move to the left. 6 But to the question of why not move farther
left Sunstein and Thaler don't have much of an answer. They invoke their
desire to increase liberty and "to allow people to go their own way" (p. 249).
That particular answer is strikingly unpersuasive in Sunstein and Thaler's
book for two reasons. First, as already mentioned, it's simply not cogent to
make claims about net increases in liberty resulting from a particular pro-
gram or protocol without looking at all the effects on all the implicated
parties and activities. Second, assessing increases in liberty would seem to
require that we know something about what kind of liberty is implicated.
Unfortunately, Sunstein and Thaler leave their conception radically under-
theorized. The most one can tell is that for Sunstein and Thaler, liberty
equals freedom of choice." This is not a particularly deep account of lib-
15. A deep frame can be activated through a metaphor or an image or a rhetorical device.
What is key to the deep frame is that it is sufficiently nonobvious to the author and reader and suffi-
ciently repetitive that it structures (nudges?) their thinking in ways of which they remain unaware.
16. And arguably not when we are concerned with the social-conservative agenda.
17. See pp. 248-49.
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erty'-and furthermore, Sunstein and Thaler tell us nothing about how or
how much we are to value freedom of choice in any particular context. And
that's a problem because evidently, Sunstein and Thaler would like us to
value it a lot. As to why persons on the left should move right from their
paternalist norms, I don't believe Sunstein and Thaler have much to say-
principally because they don't address arguments to their left.
Indeed, it is one of the small frustrations of this book that while it offers
the middle way-or even more grandly, the Third Way-it doesn't provide
much of a political frame for situating its proposal. Indeed, while it is quite
clear that Sunstein and Thaler aim to find the middle ground between liber-
tarians and paternalists, in the end it's not clear what libertarianism and
paternalism actually are. This is what they tell us: Libertarians believe in the
actuality of the rational utility maximizer. They celebrate freedom of choice
and are unwilling to give it up even in exchange for considerable welfare
benefits. As for paternalists, their ideology is even less filled out in this
book. We know this much: They are willing users of command-and-control
regulations. They are not afraid of mandates, and they are willing to use
government to protect people from their own bad choices.
These are very (very) thin positions. They are gestures. They are far too
formal, too disconnected from their substantive contexts, to allow you or I to
sign up for either side. "I like command and control" or "I'm a freedom of
choice guy"-these are not mature political positions.' 9 They have the ring
of the a priori. And they don't take seriously what they sacrifice.
What about, "I'm a nudge guy." Is that a serious position-intellectually
and politically speaking? It is appropriate in some circumstances no doubt,
and for this we should thank Sunstein and Thaler for having pointed it out so
well. But as a kind of political or intellectual ideology-I'm a nudge guy? Is
this a serious political position or is it instead a technique of governance try-
ing to be something more?
Toward the very end of their book, Sunstein and Thaler write the follow-
ing:
With respect to government, we hope that the general approach might
serve as a viable middle ground in our unnecessarily polarized society. The
twentieth century was pervaded by a great deal of artificial talk about the
possibility of a "Third Way." We are hopeful that libertarian paternalism
offers a real Third Way .... (p. 252)
Is this really the Third Way? Hard to tell.
18. As a matter of political justification, a nontrivial conception of freedom of choice must
be redeemed in an account of what kinds of choices matter. For obvious reasons, quantity of choice
is neither here nor there.
19. 1 know this sounds like an insult, but I mean it more as a diagnosis. Every political posi-
tion has flaws (e.g., romanticism, utopianism, corruption, cynicism, etc.). It is important to be able
to recognize and talk about the flaws specific to a particular position.
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Nudge begins with the metaphor of the cafeteria supervisor as a choice
architect. The book ends by proclaiming itself as the Third Way. One can be
skeptical of that claim (as I have been). But what if instead, we take the im-
plicit equation seriously? What if the Third Way-the triumph of
technocracy as it were-turns out to be politics as cafeteria?
What does one say about this? One reaction (and I believe I have said
this) is that if you're going to have a cafeteria, then you might as well have a
well-administered one. Nudge helps. Considerably.
But does politics come down to cafeteria? Is that all there is?
Well, maybe so and maybe that's a good thing too. The twentieth cen-
tury is replete with disastrous examples of what more heroic versions of
politics can bring.
So, maybe the government should be a cafeteria? Perhaps. It would be
more reassuring, though, if life on the outside (the so-called private sector)
were not itself a megacafeteria.
So is it cafeteria all around then? If so, one could well come to wonder:
What's the point? Keep the human protoplasm satisfied?
Why? To what end?
This too is a possible reaction to Nudge and the intellectual-cultural
moment it represents. Nudge is not alone. Of late, we have seen the publica-
tion of a number of these cream-colored, one-idea books that exude the
same sort of clever contentedness.20 They're smart, but thin. By design.
Pomo management science. Tastes great. Less filling. Like Nudge, they
make me want to reach back for my high modernists-something more re-
demptive, more critical, or at least less shallow-maybe Hannah Arendt on
politics. 21 Or perhaps Adorno and Horkheimer on the "administered
world., 22 Or maybe Foucault on "governmentality.' '23 But something.
20. Citations omitted. Go to your local bookstore.
21. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958).
22. See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (Gun-
zelin Schmid Noerr ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2002).
23. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE OF
FRANCE, 1978-1979, 215-316 (2008).
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